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The Political Economy of U.S. 
Broadcast Ownership  
Regulation and Free Speech  
after the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996  
 
Jeffrey Layne Blevins 
 
In a recent series of U.S. court cases involving media ownership 
regulation, broadcasters have invoked the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution to resist ownership limitations, while civil 
society organizations and critics of media consolidation have 
raised free speech rights as a rationale to promote the idea of 
ownership restrictions. This study reviews First Amendment ju-
risprudence on broadcast ownership regulation since the passage 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) and explores the 
potential for a fundamental shift in how the U.S. federal courts 
allocate speech rights in broadcasting.  While in dicta, the courts 
have remained consistent with pre-TCA landmark cases that rec-
ognized public interest concerns over broadcasters’ individual 
speech rights, dissenting justices have empathized with broad-
casters’ argument that reducing ownership regulations is in the 
public interest.  Informed by political economy, I argue that this 
nascent perspective should be rejected in accordance with a col-
lectivist interpretation of the First Amendment.  
 
T he concern about free speech rights and broadcast ownership regulation is a significant one for those who study the political economy of communi-cation; particularly as the U.S. broadcast industry continues to evolve from a highly regulated public trust to a deregulated commercial enter-
prise with world-wide reach through conglomerate parent ownership.  In view of 
this, there appears to be the roots of a fundamental shift in how the U.S. federal 
courts may allocate speech rights in broadcast media in the future, moving away 
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from a collectivist interpretation of the First Amendment (that protects the public’s 
right to receive a diverse array of viewpoints foremost) and towards an individualist 
one (that primarily favors the rights of broadcasters).  Such a shift would be trou-
bling, as it would assume that the government is the only entity capable of restrict-
ing speech in the media environment, thus neglecting the broadcaster’s inherent 
position as gatekeeper.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that 
this is not the case, especially in broadcast media.  With a growing chorus of pres-
sure from the lower federal courts, the analysis presented here will show that this 
long-standing recognition may soon be in danger of revision. 
In spite of established precedent, broadcasters have often invoked the First 
Amendment as a rationale to resist various types of regulation of their industry, 
including ownership caps.  Fox Television made this argument in court after its 
purchase of Chris-Craft Industries allowed the company to reach more national 
audience through its owned-and-operated stations than the law had then allowed.  
On February 19, 2002 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia over-
turned the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 1998 decision to retain 
the national broadcast ownership cap rule, and ordered that the FCC reconsider if 
the rule should be retained, and determine what circumstances would merit its re-
tention.1 The ruling was used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
to support its decision to further relax media ownership rules on June 2, 2003.2 
The Philadelphia-based Prometheus Radio Project (on behalf of the Media Ac-
cess Project, a civil society organization) challenged the FCC’s rule changes, also 
citing free speech concerns, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia 
remanded key parts of those changes on June 24, 2004.3 Although many broadcast-
ers hoped that the Bush Administration would step in, neither the Justice Depart-
ment nor the FCC challenged the Prometheus ruling.  Subsequently, a group of 
media corporations, including Tribune Co., Fox, NBC Universal, and Viacom ap-
pealed the Third Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court, citing in part that their 
free speech rights were being violated.4 On June 13, 2005 the Supreme Court de-
clined to hear the appeals, thus letting stand the Third Circuit appellate court ruling 
that dismissed the FCC rule changes.  Nonetheless, the conflicting claims about 
free speech and broadcast ownership regulation have been raised in the Fox Televi-
sion Stations and Prometheus Radio Project cases have left the legality of broadcast 
ownership regulation on somewhat uncertain terms, while each side has called upon 
the federal courts for clarity.   
In the case of broadcast ownership regulation and the First Amendment, this 
study questions whether there has been a shift in judicial discourse concerning the 
allocation of free speech rights to individual broadcasters and the collective public 
well being since the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA).5 That 
is, has federal jurisprudence on this matter been in accordance with legislative and 
administrative policymaking since the passage of the Act?  If so, then a new era in 
broadcast policy has truly begun.  If not, then the federal courts may inhibit the 
course of legislative enactments and FCC rulemaking.  Or, has there been inconsis-
tency within the federal courts since the passage of the 1996 Act about the appro-
priate relationship of free speech between broadcasters and the public, thus leaving 
the matter on uncertain terms? 
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In order to explore the jurisprudential discourse surrounding the debate between 
free speech and broadcast ownership regulation this study will first review the dif-
fering individualist and collectivist understandings of media laws, as well as the 
courts’ application of the collectivist perspective in relevant cases involving broad-
cast media.  Next, I will argue that the vantage point of political economy can elu-
cidate critical concerns about the allocation of First Amendment rights between the 
public and broadcasters.  I will then analyze U.S. federal court cases that resolved 
First Amendment issues related to broadcast ownership regulation since the passage 
of the TCA to determine whether the courts have found the First Amendment to be 
in favor of protecting the individual free speech rights of broadcasters from some 
regulatory infringement, or that the First Amendment protected the collective rights 
of citizens, thus justifying some form of ownership regulation.  Additionally, the 
potential consequence of a fundamental shift in the federal courts about the under-
pinnings of First Amendment theory and the allocation of speech rights in broad-
cast media is discussed.  Lastly, I will argue that the collectivist interpretation of 
the First Amendment should prevail in the matter of broadcast ownership regula-




Balancing collective and individual free speech rights in 
broadcasting 
 
The conflicting claims about the nature of free speech rights between broadcasters 
and citizen groups represent one of the innermost debates in First Amendment the-
ory.  As Philip Napoli put it, that question is “whether the First Amendment is pri-
marily intended to protect the speech rights of the individual or the speech rights 
and well-being of the citizenry as a collective.”6 The First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press . . . .”7 The individualist interpretation sees the First 
Amendment as a means to protect individuals from unjust governmental intrusion 
and preserving individual rights of self-expression.  This reading is to some extent 
similar to absolutism, in that it places special emphasis on the “no law” passage of 
the First Amendment.  However, not all absolutists agree on what exactly merits 
absolute protection.  For instance, even the most noted absolutists, such as Alexan-
der Meiklejohn and Hugo Black, suggested that commercial speech (e.g., advertis-
ing) did not merit the First Amendment protection that political speech enjoys.8 
Rather, as Robert McChesney put it, this brand of absolutism “has the core strength 
of keeping its eyes on the prize: democracy.9 Being somewhat distinct, however, 
the individualist view of the First Amendment is means oriented in that it sees the 
preservation of individual rights to free expression as the best way to achieve all 
other goals associated with the First Amendment.10 Broadcasters invoke the indi-
vidualist perspective of the First Amendment when they resist media ownership 
regulation as restriction of their right to free speech. 
Contrarily, a collectivist perspective rejects such an individualist interpretation  
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and would recognize (perhaps, more literally) that while Congress is barred from 
making laws that abridge free speech, it is not prohibited from enacting laws that 
create or enhance expression.11 As such, a collectivist view of the First Amendment 
is ends oriented by focusing on the goal of the First Amendment to foster vibrant 
public discourse and self-governance.  Therefore, if one believes that media owner-
ship regulation enhances civic discourse within a society by allowing a wider range 
of viewpoints in broadcast programming, then it is well within the bounds of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.12 
The jurisprudential distinction between the interests of the broadcasters (as indi-
vidual speakers) and the collective interests of their audience (as citizens within a 
democracy) to receive speech also parallels a long terms struggle within political 
economy regarding an analytic focus on production, versus a focus on consump-
tion.  This debate was most fractious in the mid-1990s within the larger realm of 
critical research, between scholars representing political economy and cultural stud-
ies.13 While the broader debate became rancorous at times, Peter Golding and Gra-
ham Murdock provided a more dispassionate and productive assessment of these 
analytic traditions in propounding a “critical” political economy approach to com-
munication study.14 Golding and Murdock identify a significant weakness in the 
cultural studies approach that only focuses on audience interpretation of media 
texts because it can easily be conflated as “untrammeled consumer choice” and thus 
ignore “the ways in which people’s consumption choices are structured by their 
position in the wider economic formation.”15 Rather, as Golding and Murdock go 
on to explain, a “critical” view of political economy should be especially interested 
in the ways that communicative activity is produced and “structured by the unequal 
distribution of material and symbolic resources.”16 As McChesney explained, one 
of the primary distinctions of political economy is  
its explicit commitment to participatory democracy.  Research is 
driven by a central premise drawn directly from classical democ-
ratic political theory: the notion that democracy is predicated 
upon an informed participating citizenry, and that a political cul-
ture typified by an active and informed citizenry can only be gen-
erated in final analysis by a healthy and vibrant media system.17 
This goal of political economy is in accord with a collectivist interpretation of the 
First Amendment, and directs further attention to media ownership and government 
regulation of media institutions. 
Napoli pointed out that while scholars such as Stanley Ingber18 and Robert 
Post19 have described the U.S. Supreme Court as interpreting the First Amendment 
within the individualist framework, the Court has also clearly asserted a collectivist 
perspective as it relates to broadcasting.  This is consistent with the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, which granted the authority to regulate broadcasting in the 
“public interest, convenience, and necessity.”20 The U.S. Supreme Court in its 1969 
decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C. explicitly stated: “the people as a 
whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have 
the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, 
which is paramount.”21 
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The Court’s acknowledgement of the collective interest of citizens to receive a 
diverse array of viewpoints and opinions through a scarce public resource was con-
gruent with its opinion in two other landmark First Amendment cases.  In Associ-
ated Press v. U.S. case in 1945, the Court said that the First Amendment “rests on 
the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”22 Although the 
Court’s opinion in this case was directed to the print medium, it clearly posited that 
protecting the collective welfare of the public as a goal of the First Amendment.  
Moreover, the Court explicitly recognized that non-governmental interests (e.g., 
private corporations) may infringe the public’s freedom of speech by restraining its 
ability to receive a diverse array of news and information. 
 
Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the 
free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combina-
tions a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom.     . . .  Freedom of the press from govern-
mental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction 
repression of that freedom by private interests.  The First Amend-
ment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a 
combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitu-
tional immunity.23 
 
Again, the Supreme Court issued this opinion in the context of the print medium, 
which has enjoyed some of the fullest individual First Amendment protections; 
unlike broadcasting, which has historically had the least of such individual liberty 
due to the dual notions of spectrum scarcity and public interest obligations.  Ac-
cordingly, if the Court is loathe in entertaining the argument that private interests 
have any constitutional immunity from ownership regulation in the print medium, 
then it would certainly be even less inclined to accept this rationale in the broadcast 
realm. 
In the 1943 National Broadcasting Co., Inc., et al. v. United States decision the 
Court, in dismissing the broadcast network’s claim that their First Amendment 
rights were infringed by ownership regulation, had also recognized the greater col-
lective interest of the public over the individual liberty of broadcasters by stating, 
“The 'public interest' to be served under the Communications Act is thus the inter-
est of the listening public in 'the larger and more effective use of radio.’”24 
From these cases, it seemed that the collectivist interpretation of the First 
Amendment, especially as it applies to broadcasting, was firmly fixed in federal 
jurisprudence.  However, there has been concern among political economists since 
the passage of the TCA that the FCC’s media ownership policies are in contrast 
with such First Amendment jurisprudence.25 Moreover, how the U.S. federal courts 
distinguish the First Amendment, as a protection of the individual rights of broad-
casters, or the collective well-being of the citizenry since the passage of the 1996 
Act may have a significant impact upon the future shape of broadcast ownership 
regulation in the United States. 
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The political economy of recasting First Amendment 
rights between broadcasters and the public: Neoliberal-
ism and its discontents 
 
Recasting First Amendment protection from the collective welfare of the public to 
the individual liberties of media owners has been an integral component of the ar-
guments made by the proponents of decimating media ownership caps.  As will be 
discussed here, this line of reasoning clearly fits within a broader neoliberal agenda 
to facilitate “the flow and accumulation of capital for a relatively small number of 
private interests,” while also averting public interest regulations.26 Neoliberalism is 
the fundamental belief that state power should be limited in favor of an enhanced 
private sphere (constituted by free markets and private property), and this philoso-
phy can be seen where lawmakers have steadily treated the U.S. broadcast industry 
less like a regulated public trust and more like a purely commercial enterprise that 
should be mostly freed from government constraint.   
The beginning of this course was marked by Mark Fowler and Daniel Brenner’s 
classic law review article in 1982 that propounded a market-based approach to 
broadcast regulation,27 and was steadily implemented in Fowler’s chairmanship of 
the FCC during the Presidential Administration of Ronald Reagan, as well as 
throughout subsequent administrations during the 1980s and 1990s.  Over this time 
period the FCC rescinded the Fairness Doctrine and steadily relaxed media owner-
ship rules.  The process reached its pinnacle moment with the passage of the TCA, 
which, as McChesney described, 
laid down the core values for the FCC to implement for genera-
tions.  The operating premise of the law was that new communi-
cation technologies combined with an increased appreciation for 
the genius of the market rendered the traditional regulatory model 
moot.  The solution therefore was to lift regulations and owner-
ship restrictions from commercial media and communication 
companies, allow competition in the marketplace to develop, and 
reduce the government’s role to that of protecting private prop-
erty.28 
 As Patricia Aufderheide also explained, the TCA represented the “ideological ar-
chitecture of a new era in communication policy” and put forth a guiding neoliberal 
philosophy that had been “evolving in regulatory practice over the past two dec-
ades, with much contestation in the courts.”29 
Broadcasters have continually pursued such a regulatory structural change, 
along with the recasting of First Amendment rights and how they apply to broad-
casters and the public.30 As McChesney described, media industries have argued for 
decades that “free market competition and new technologies eliminated the need for 
public interest regulation,” and thus, violated their First Amendment rights.31 Al-
though broadcasters have not yet convinced the courts that ownership rules are an 
unconstitutional abridgement of their speech rights, passage of the TCA showed 
that their desire for neoliberal economic policy had congealed within the FCC and 
Congress.  As many works have demonstrated, the electronic media industries have 
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“captured” the FCC32 while also brandishing enormous influence within Congress. 
33 As such, the policy endeavors undertaken by Congress and the FCC are mostly 
inseparable from communication industries influential lobbying and media plat-
forms.  
The same media industries that have asserted an individualist interpretation of 
the First Amendment are also the ones who designed the neoliberal architecture 
adopted by Congress in the TCA and set to be built by the FCC.  For instance, Title 
II, Section 202(h) of the TCA requires the FCC to review its ownership rules to 
determine “whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as a result 
of competition.” After passage of the TCA, the broadcasters argument continued to 
be catered to by FCC Chairman Michael Powell during his agency’s third biennial 
review of media ownership rules34 that lead to the 2003 Report and Order relaxing 
several ownership concentration protections.35 In its review under Chairman Pow-
ell’s guidance, the FCC narrowed its analytic perspective to the economic aspects 
of media ownership rules, while ignoring many other concerns raised by the 
broader public, thereby gratifying the wishes of industry stakeholders.36 As 
McChesney noted, Powell was a clear proponent of extending the First Amendment 
rights of broadcasters, which involved “unvarnished praise for free markets.”37 This 
was, perhaps, best evidenced by Chairman Powell’s remarks before the Media In-
stitute in 1998 when he criticized the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the mat-
ter.38 However, Powell’s desire to reshape broadcast ownership policy while trans-
forming the rhetoric about ‘public interest’ into ‘competition under anti-trust laws’ 
may have ignored First Amendment jurisprudence about the collective rights of 
citizens in a democracy, and thus, set the stage for legal challenges in federal court. 
While neoliberal economic philosophy embedded with Congress and the FCC 
has called for an individualist interpretation of the First Amendment, the analysis 
presented here questions whether the federal courts would agree with this under-
standing of free speech, especially given the Supreme Court’s disposition for a col-
lectivist interpretation in broadcast media (as discussed in the previous section).  
Although, the legislature has the authority to enact statutes under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and may even delegate parts of its lawmaking authority to administrative 
agencies that it has created (such as the FCC), questions about the proper interpre-
tation, application and Constitutionality of those laws are ultimately decided within 
the federal courts.  Therefore, it is significant to consider how the federal courts 
have assessed the individualist interpretation of the First Amendment espoused by 
communication businesses as speakers, versus the collectivist interpretation con-
cerned with the rights of citizens within a democracy to receive speech.  From the 
critical orientation of political economy, it would be of further importance to under-
stand the federal courts’ discernment of the neoliberal economic logic that has been 
employed by Congress and the FCC, against any counter moral rationale of fairness 
over economic efficiency. 
Scholars from the milieu of political economy have long questioned the neolib-
eral policy shift, and it impact on the future structure of broadcast ownership, as 
well as the implications of that structure for the free flow of ideas, news and infor-
mation.39 Such concern is raised by the very essence of political economy’s moral 
philosophical outlook,40 which “goes beyond technical issues of efficiency to en-
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gage with basic moral questions of justice, equity, and the public good.”41 From his 
extensive quantitative and qualitative examination of the subject, Mark Cooper 
concluded that ownership rules, which limit “merger activity to a small number of 
markets is well justified on the basis of empirical data, statutory language and Su-
preme Court jurisprudence.”42  
Similarly, Vincent Mosco noted the significance of such changes when they 
occurred within the North American telecommunication industry.43 Citing his ear-
lier work44 and that of Kevin Wilson,45 Mosco noted that “political economists have 
examined the changes in discourse that accompany structural changes, specifically 
by exploring the roots of a shift in the dominant rhetoric from that of ‘public’ ser-
vice provided by regulated monopolies to ‘cost-based’ service offered by market 
competitors.”46 Eileen Meehan, Mosco and Janet Wasko have also explained that  
 
political economy’s grounding in history, moral philosophy, so-
cial totality, and praxis orients researchers to the study of social 
change through economic restructuring.  The integration of his-
torical, social, and analytic methods provides tools to uncover 
and explain structural continuity and structural change.47 
 
Accordingly, this study blends political economy’s moral philosophical outlook 
with legal analysis to explore the judicial discourse concerning the allocation of 
free speech rights between individual broadcasters and the public since the passage 
of the TCA.  The following questions are considered in the analysis:  Has federal 
jurisprudence been consistent with pre-TCA landmark cases?  Has there been in-
consistency within the federal courts since the passage of the TCA about the appro-
priate relationship of free speech between broadcasters and the public?  What im-
plications can be drawn from federal court dicta and dissenting opinions about free 
speech and broadcast ownership since the passage of the TCA? 
 
 
Examining federal jurisprudence on broadcast owner-
ship and the First Amendment 
 
In order to identify all federal jurisprudence on broadcast ownership regulation and 
the First Amendment since the passage of the TCA, the author consulted Westlaw’s 
online legal research service that provides access to U.S. statutes and case law ma-
terials.  The researcher used Westlaw’s “key search” method that comprehensively 
classifies case law.  Under “key search” classifications of “communications,” “free 
speech” and “telecommunication,” the author did a Boolean search of all federal 
cases using variants of the terms “broadcast ownership” and “First Amendment.”  
A total of 22 cases were identified, of which seven were decided after passage of 
the TCA.  Of those seven, three cases (all of which were decided at the circuit court 
level) specifically addressed First Amendment claims about the FCC’s decision to 
enforce broadcast ownership rules pursuant to the TCA.  As such, those cases 
(Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 2004; Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. 
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F.C.C., 2002;48 and Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. F.C.C., 2002) comprised the 
focus of this analysis. 
The remaining four cases addressed a wider array of issues.  Ruggiero v. the 
F.C.C. (2003)49 regarded the FCC’s enforcement of the Radio Broadcasting Preser-
vation Act of 2000 (RBPA) that prohibited anyone who operated an unlicensed 
radio station from obtaining a low power FM license; Time Warner Entertainment 
Co., L.P. v. F.C.C. (2001)50 concerned ownership restrictions on cable operators 
(not over-the-air broadcasters); Arkansas Educ. Television Com’n v. Forbes (1998)
51 involved a state-owned public television broadcasters exclusion of a political 
candidate from a televised debate; and BellSouth Corp. v. F.C.C. (1998)52 consid-
ered a regional bell operating company’s challenge of a statute limiting its ability to 
provide electronic publishing.  Because these four cases were not directly relevant 
to this issue at hand, they were each excluded from further analysis.  
For the three cases that are the focus of this analysis (Fox Television Stations, 
Inc. v. F.C.C., 2002; Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. F.C.C., 2002; and Prome-
theus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 2004) the author performed a “key cite” reference 
check on Westlaw, which as part of its legal reporting service monitors all cases 
and provides an up-to-date status on the binding legal authority of cases.  Both the 
Fox Television and Sinclair Broadcast cases contained just the same two negative 
citing references.  One negative reference was from the court decision in Cellco 
Partnership v. F.C.C. (2004),53 which was only distinguished by a different set of 
facts in the case.  In Cellco Partnership, the court did not resolve any First Amend-
ment claims, or broadcast ownership regulations, as the case involved telephone 
services.  Moreover, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
that decided the Cellco Partnership case was also the same court that decided the 
Fox Television and Sinclair Broadcast cases, so the decision represents no conflict 
among the circuits.  The other negative citing reference came from the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in the Prometheus decision.  Here, the Prometheus court pro-
vided a slightly different framework for its opinion, and that decision is analyzed 
later as part of this study.  All other citing references to the Fox Television and Sin-
clair Broadcast decisions were positive, and the Prometheus decision contained no 
negative citing references.  Therefore, the three cases analyzed as part of this study 
represent an authoritative jurisprudential perspective on federal broadcast owner-
ship regulation and the First Amendment.  
Additionally, a brief instrumental analysis of John Roberts appointment as 
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court is provided herein to examine the potential 
impact that a newly shaped Supreme Court may have on future litigation.  As 
Meehan, Mosco and Wasko described, instrumental analysis “traces the personal 
and business networks within institutions” relying on several sources for data, in-
cluding “government documents, required corporate disclosures, trade journals” 
and the like.54 The fact that John Roberts served as a counsel for broadcasters in one 
of the cases examined in this analysis, as well as his financial interests in Disney, 
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Broadcast ownership and free speech after the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 
 
The Prometheus, Sinclair and Fox decisions will be analyzed in chronological or-
der.  After providing a brief summary of the facts and legal history for each case, 
the author will then examine the holding, paying particular attention to the court’s 
assessment of free speech rights for broadcasters vs. the public.  Accordingly, Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. F.C.C. is the first case to be analyzed. 
As noted earlier, Fox Television Stations brought suit over the FCC’s decision 
to retain the National Television Station Ownership (NTSO) rule.  The case came 
before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia among five consolidated 
petitions regarding media ownership rules.  Fox Television claimed that the FCC’s 
decision to retain the NTSO rule was a violation of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), the TCA and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  While the 
court determined that the FCC’s decision not to repeal the NTSO rule was arbitrary 
and capricious, thus violating the APA, and in violation of the TCA, it found that 
the rule did not violate broadcasters First Amendment rights. 
In its decision to remand the NTSO rule back to the FCC for further review, the 
Fox court still recognized that “the public interest” in broadcast regulation has em-
braced both “diversity” and “localism,” and therefore, the question “is whether the 
Commission adequately justified its retention decision as necessary to further diver-
sity and localism.”55 While the court found that rationale offered by the FCC to 
retain the rule was insufficient and did not demonstrate its necessity to support the 
public interest, it nonetheless recognized the values of ‘diversity’ and ‘localism’ as 
part of the ‘public interest’ mandate, each of which are collectivist goals of the First 
Amendment.  
Moreover, in dismissing the First Amendment claim brought by Fox Television, 
the court said that broadcasters had not shown any compelling reason why it should 
abandon precedent established by the Supreme Court in F.C.C. v. National Citizens 
Committee for Broadcasting,56 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., and National 
Broadcasting Co. v. U.S.  Although the court agreed that the FCC had done an in-
sufficient job of justifying the NTSO rule, it said that such a rule could still be con-
stitutionally valid under the First Amendment.  As such, the Fox court’s explana-
tion deserves to be quoted at length:  
 
This paean to the undoubted virtues of a free market in television 
stations is not, however, responsive to the question whether the 
Congress could reasonably determine that a more diversified 
ownership of television stations would likely lead to the presenta-
tion of more diverse points of view.  By limiting the number of 
stations each network (or other entity) may own, the NTSO Rule 
ensures that there are more owners than there would otherwise 
be.  An industry with a larger number of owners may well be less 
efficient than a more concentrated industry.  Both consumer satis-
faction and potential operating cost savings may be sacrificed as 
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a result of the Rule.  But that is not to say the Rule is unreason-
able because the Congress may, in the regulation of broadcasting, 
constitutionally pursue values other than efficiency -- including 
in particular diversity in programming, for which diversity of 
ownership is perhaps an aspirational but surely not an irrational 
proxy.  Simply put, it is not unreasonable – and therefore not un-
constitutional – for the Congress to prefer having in the aggregate 
more voices heard . . . . 57 
 
  The D.C. court may have been sympathetic to the economic argument being for-
warded by broadcasters, but nonetheless, respected the Congress’ prerogative to 
support collectivist goals of the First Amendment, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of its constitutional validity. 
Sinclair Broadcasting’s suit was also decided in the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in 2002 as the company challenged the FCC’s adoption of a 
new Local Ownership Order, which allowed common ownership of two television 
stations in a single market provided that one of the stations is not among the four 
highest ranked stations and that eight independently owned, full-powered stations 
existed in the market after the merger.  Sinclair disputed the Order on grounds that 
(1) the eight independent voices limit was arbitrary and capricious, (2) failing to 
fully grandfather existing local marketing agreements (that allowed a television 
station or other entity to manage programming, sales, and operations at another 
station) violated the TCA, and (3) the restriction violated the First Amendment. 
The Sinclair court held that the FCC had not provided sufficient justification for 
counting fewer types of voices in the local ownership rule, which only included 
broadcast media, compared to the agency’s rule on cross-ownership of radio and 
television stations that included newspapers and cable systems in addition to broad-
casting outlets.  Therefore, the court remanded the case back to the FCC to recon-
sider its definition of voices in conjunction with its numerical limits.  Additionally, 
the court found that limits for grandfathering local market agreements did violate 
the TCA.  Lastly, the court rejected Sinclair’s First Amendment challenge. 
In rejecting Sinclair’s First Amendment claim, the majority held that 
‘there is no unabridgeable First Amendment right comparable to 
the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish’ to hold a 
broadcast license . . . Sinclair does not have a First Amendment 
right to hold a broadcast license where it would not, under the 
Local Ownership Order, satisfy the public interest.58 
 
Moreover, the majority relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in F.C.C. v. Na-
tional Citizens Committee for Broadcasting to uphold 
 
an ownership restriction analogous to the Local Ownership Or-
der, based on the same reasons of diversity and competition . . . 
in recognition that such an ownership limitation significantly 
furthers the First Amendment interest in a robust exchange of 
viewpoints.59 
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Thus, the court found Sinclair’s complaint that the decision in F.C.C. v. National 
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting no longer applicable with the development of 
cable television, direct broadcast satellite and the Internet was “to no avail.”60 By 
invoking the ‘public interest’ rationale in its holding, as well as its explicit state-
ment that ownership limitation furthers ‘the First Amendment interest in a robust 
exchange of viewpoints,’ it is clear that the majority in this case respected the col-
lective free speech rights of the public over the individual First Amendment liber-
ties of broadcasters. 
However, Justice Sentelle filed a dissenting opinion on the First Amendment 
matter.  While conceding that it was not the place of his court to reject the estab-
lished precedent of the Supreme Court on this matter, Sentelle did strike a tone of 
activism when he stated:  
 
Perhaps with now-Chairman Powell’s announcement that the 
‘time has come to reexamine First Amendment jurisprudence as it 
has been applied to broadcast media and bring it into line with the 
realities of today’s communications marketplace,’ the Supreme 
Court will take notice.61 
 
Sentelle cited Chairman Powell’s 1998 speech before the Media Institute noted 
earlier in this analysis.62 Indeed, Powell’s efforts while Chair of the FCC to further 
diminish broadcast ownership rules was consistent with his belief that broadcasters 
should be afforded more individual First Amendment protections over the collec-
tive free speech concerns of the public.  The rule changes Powell instituted in 2003 
set the stage for the next court challenge.  
After the FCC rule changes were announced on June 2, 2003, several public 
interest and consumer advocacy groups petitioned for judicial review of the order.  
Several media associations and broadcasters also challenged the order, some claim-
ing that some of the revisions and the nonappearance of further deregulation vio-
lated the TCA.  The appeals were consolidated into the case of Prometheus Radio 
Project v. F.C.C. and heard before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadel-
phia, PA in 2004.  While the court affirmed several parts of the FCC’s order, it 
found that the agency’s  
 
derivation of new Cross-Media Limits, and its modification of the 
numerical limits on both television and radio station ownership 
local markets, all have the same essential flaw: an unjustified 
assumption that media outlets of the same type make an equal 
contribution to diversity and competition in local markets.63 
 
Therefore, the court issued a remand that the FCC needs to reconsider its approach 
to setting numerical limits. 
In resolving the First Amendment claims, the Prometheus court addressed the 
pro-deregulatory petitioners claim that 
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restrictions on the common ownership of newspapers and broad-
cast stations contravenes the First Amendment because it limits 
the speech opportunities of newspaper owners and broadcast sta-
tions owners, and hence limits the public’s access to informa-
tion.64 
 
Interestingly, media owners had not only asserted their First Amendment rights, but 
attempted to link their individual liberty to the collective welfare of the public’s 
access to information.  However, the court was not swayed and declined the oppor-
tunity to disregard the established precedent of the Supreme Court, noting that the 
high court “has said that limiting common ownership is a reasonable means of pro-
moting the public interest in viewpoint diversity.”65 
However, Chief Judge Scirica agreed with the pro-deregulatory petitioners in a 
separate opinion that dissented in part and concurred in part with the majority’s 
opinion.  Scirica said that the FCC’s decision to repeal national ownership caps for 
television and radio broadcasting recognized the “potential economic efficiency 
gains from ‘group ownership actually further . . . rather than frustrate . . . the fore-
most First Amendment goal of augmenting popular discussion of important public 
issues.’”66 Scirica’s linkage of individual freedoms afforded to broadcasters and the 
collective public good is clear. 
 
 
Roots of change in First Amendment jurisprudence on 
broadcast ownership regulation?  
 
While in dicta the D.C. Circuit Court may have been sympathetic with the neolib-
eral economic arguments forwarded by broadcasters, and may even disagree with 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to reconsider the matter, it has nonetheless respected 
the prerogative of Congress and the supremacy of the high court.  While the FCC 
and Congress may be more prone to political pressure in the U.S. communication 
policymaking system, the federal courts are called to adjudicate consistent with the 
principles and precedents established by the Supreme Court. 
However, one may wonder how long the Supreme Court may let current prece-
dent stand if there is a growing chorus of pressure from broadcasters, the FCC and 
lower courts for it to reevaluate the philosophical underpinnings of this specific 
area of law.  Although, the majority opinions from the D.C. Circuit ultimately up-
held Supreme Court precedent, two dissenting opinions were clearly in support of 
the broadcasters assertions and have suggested the high court should reconsider.  
Even though the Supreme Court refused the opportunity to take appeals from the 
Third Circuits decision in Prometheus v. F.C.C., it is likely that broadcasters will 
continue to forward the First Amendment argument on subsequent appeals, provid-
ing the high court with future opportunities to reshape jurisprudence in this area.  
Perhaps, this opportunity may come about, as the Supreme Court itself is reshaped. 
With the passing of William Rehnquist in 2005, John Roberts joined the Su-
preme Court as the new Chief Justice.  Another new appointee, Samuel Alito, 
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joined the Court in 2006 with the retirement of Sandra Day O’Connor.  If they are 
so inclined, the two new justices may have an effect on the Court’s decision to 
grant certiorari for a case that involves the key question dealt with in this analysis, 
especially since one is the Chief Justice.  It is the Chief Justice who compiles the 
“discuss list” from the certiorari petitions each week for the Court’s weekly meet-
ing “based upon his own review and suggestions from other Justices.”67 It then 
takes four justices to agree to grant certiorari. 
Moreover, prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts 
served as a counselor for the petitioners in Fox Television Stations, Inc. et al v. 
FCC, a key case that was analyzed earlier in this study.  Part of the petitioner’s ar-
gument in that case was the idea that ownership rules restricted the free speech 
rights of broadcasters by prohibiting them “from exercising their editorial discre-
tion to select and provide the video programming of their choice in the localities of 
their choice and to the audience of their choice.”68 Roberts’ work on this case, his 
personal financial interests in media companies such as Disney (which holds broad-
cast licenses), Time Warner, and Blockbuster,69 as well as his representation of 
other corporate media clients while a partner at Hogan & Hartson law firm has 
raised concern among civil society organizations about the impact he may have on 
the U.S. media environment in the position of Supreme Court Chief Justice.  As the 
Center for Digital Democracy asked:  
 
As a defender of the ‘free speech’ rights of media corporations, 
what are Judge Roberts views on the role of ownership policy to 
protect and enhance the First Amendment rights of the public?70 
 
Based on the arguments made in Fox Television Stations, Inc. et al. v. FCC, it may 
appear that Roberts would favor the individual First Amendment rights of broad-
casters, over the collective free speech interests of the public in future adjudications 
involving broadcast ownership regulation.  However, this position would be a dra-
matic shift for the Supreme Court, which is tasked with providing concentrated 
attention to such constitutional issues.  In its most recent opportunity to hear the 
issue in the Prometheus case that came before Roberts’ arrival, the Supreme Court 
did not grant certiorari.  Perhaps, this is because the broader First Amendment issue 
within the individualist/collectivist debate has been sufficiently addressed by the 
lower federal courts in accordance with long-standing Supreme Court precedent. 
 
 
Conclusion: Individual and collective free speech rights 
in broadcasting 
 
From the majority opinions expressed in the three cases examined here (Fox Tele-
vision Stations, Inc. v. F.C.C., Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. F.C.C., and Prome-
theus Radio Project v. F.C.C.) it is evident that federal jurisprudence on broadcast 
ownership regulation and free speech since the passage of the TCA has remained 
congruent with established Supreme Court precedent from the pre-TCA landmark 
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cases (National Broadcasting Co., Inc. et al. v. United States, Associated Press v. 
U.S., and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.), thus favoring the collectivist inter-
pretation.  However, as also found in this study, a persuasive rhetorical device that 
may affect any reconsideration by the Supreme Court on the matter is the linkage of 
group ownership of media outlets as fostering the public’s collective right to infor-
mation, and hence, the characterization of ownership limits as a restriction of the 
public’s free speech rights. 
Nevertheless, this First Amendment analysis from the standpoint of political 
economy disagrees with the perspective that ownership regulations violate the indi-
vidual speech rights of broadcasters, and that speech rights of the collective are best 
served by removing ownership restrictions.  Rather, as the federal courts have 
maintained in the post-TCA cases examined here, the First Amendment protects the 
public interest foremost in broadcasting, even over that of the broadcasters who 
purport to serve that interest.  It is evident that the federal courts in assessing free 
speech rights after the TCA have remained true to the principle set out in Associ-
ated Press v. U.S.: “Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the 
First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private inter-
ests.”71 Thus, even from the ‘individualist’ perspective of the First Amendment, it 
could be argued that the protection of speech rights of individual human beings is 
paramount to that of individual corporate entities.72 As such, Maria Simone and Jan 
Fernback have observed that regulation that encourages “extensive selection and 
distribution of individual expressions, are in keeping with the First Amendment, 
not opposed to it.”73 Individual expressions in this case, mean that of individual 
human beings.  
Furthermore, from the vantage point of political economy, the idea that owner-
ship regulation restricts the public’s free speech rights is a sophistic notion. As 
Oscar Gandy noted while outlining political economy’s critique of neoclassical 
economics: 
 
Far too frequently the consumer must rely upon the self-serving 
information provided by the producer or distributor of goods who 
has an interest in hiding some qualities, while placing other at-
tributes up front and center.74 
 
While further relaxation (or elimination of) broadcast ownership rules would result 
in greater economies of scale wherein the remaining ownership groups might prom-
ise enhanced news and information services, along with expanded variety in its 
entertainment programming, it still neglects the issue of diversity.  The value of 
diversity is more than just consumer-choice within a defined market.  Rather, as 
Robert Horwitz remarked, in drawing upon Theodore Glasser’s analysis, 
 
[d]iversity is ensconced within the values which underlie the free-
dom of speech, values which demand divergent points of view 
both because they nurture an informed, self-governing citizenry 
and because they promote cultural pluralism.75 
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Therefore, a variety of television networks, genres and formats do not have the 
same essence as diversity of voices, which is a human quality.  However, if that 
distinction were to become lost upon the high court, it may well produce a new 
legal precedent in affording First Amendment rights to broadcasters and the public.  
Moreover, such a precedent would essentially allow corporate media the power of 
censorship via exclusion.  Corporate interests will not necessarily tolerate the di-
verse array of viewpoint that democracy needs to flourish. 
Even more than illustrating how the long-standing conflict between collectivist 
and individualist interpretations of the First Amendment has become a focal point 
in broadcast ownership regulation, this debate ultimately challenges us to ask the 
most vital questions about the purpose of free speech in a democracy:  Is its pri-
mary function only to preserve the individual rights of citizens from infringement 
by the government?  Or, is intended to protect the citizenry’s speech liberties from 
infringement by any entity (government or private)?  While Supreme Court prece-
dent has clearly established that in broadcast media it is the latter, this study has 
shown that future challenges brought by broadcasters, along with dissenters in the 
federal circuit courts and a reshaped a high court may soon change the answer.  
Meanwhile, the critical perspective of political economy beckons us not to ignore 
the inherent power of broadcast entities to determine what so many hear and see 
over the public’s airwaves.  Armoring broadcasters with constitutional immunity 
from ownership regulation would allow them unrestricted power to censor speech 
over an important public resource.  Meanwhile, scholars of First Amendment juris-
prudence and political economy should reject this nascent idea that the relaxation of 
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